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IV. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this appeal 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (1953 as amended). 
V. ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND THE STANDARD OF REVIEW 
a. The issues presented for review are: 
1. Did the lower court materially err in ruling that, as a 
matter of law, Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the proximate 
cause of a post-collision ambulance ride, diagnostic 
examinations, and other injuries sustained by Mr. LeBlanc in the 
automobile collision of October 6, 1992? 
2. Did the lower court materially err in denying Mr. 
LeBlanc's Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New 
Trial on the grounds that there was sufficient evidence to 
support the jury's verdict that Mr. Wilker's negligence was not 
the proximate cause of a post-collision ambulance ride, 
diagnostic examinations, and other injuries sustained by Mr. 
LeBlanc in the automobile collision of October 6, 1992? 
b. The standards of review in this case are as follows: 
1. A lower court's findings of facts underlying its 
decision to grant or deny a motion for judgment notwithstanding 
the verdict and new trial may be upheld unless they are clearly 
erroneous. However, the appellate court may review the lower 
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court's legal conclusions in regards thereto under a correction 
of error standard. State v. Steward, 806 P.2d 213, 215 (Utah 
App. 1991). 
2. In considering a motion for a new trial based upon 
insufficient evidence, the appellate court is required to accord 
the evidence presented every reasonable inference fairly drawn 
from the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing 
party. Peats v. Commercial Sec. Bank, 746 P.2d 1191, 1192 (Utah 
App. 1987). 
3. The appellate court may reverse a trial court's denial 
of a motion for judgment notwithstanding verdict or new trial 
only if, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
prevailing party, there is no sufficient evidence upon which the 
jury could have based its verdict. Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 
817 P.2d 789, 799-800 (Utah 1991); King v. Fereday, 739 P.2d 618, 
620, 621 (Utah 1987); Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. Rollins, Brown & 
Gunnel1, Inc., 713 P.2d 55, 57-58 (Utah 1986). 
VI. DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, 
ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
Rule 50(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
relevant part: 
(b) Motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. 
Whenever a motion for a directed verdict made at the close 
of all of the evidence is denied or for any reason is not 
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granted, the court is deemed to have submitted the action to 
the jury subject to a later determination of the legal 
questions raised by the motion. Not later than ten days 
after entry of judgment, a party who has moved for a 
directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any 
judgment entered thereon set aside and to have judgment 
entered in accordance with his motion for a directed verdict 
. . . . A motion for new trial may be joined with this 
motion, or a new trial may be prayed for in the alternative. 
If a verdict was returned the court may allow the judgment 
to stand or may reopen the judgment and either order a new 
trial or direct the entry of judgment as if the requested 
verdict had been directed. . . . 
U. R. Civ. P. 50(b). 
Rule 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides, in 
relevant part: 
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61, a 
new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties and on 
all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes. 
. . . 
. . . . 
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to 
have been given under the influence of passion or 
prejudice. 
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the 
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law. 
(7) Error in law. 
U. R. Civ. P. 59(a). 
VII. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings, Disposition in 
the Lower Court. 
On or about October 6, 1992 Plaintiff/Petitioner Fred 
LeBlanc ("Mr. LeBlanc'') was severely injured when the vehicle he 
3 
was driving was struck from behind by a vehicle driven by 
Defendant/Respondent James Wilker ("Mr. Wilker"). Mr. LeBlanc's 
complaint seeks to recover damages for his injuries. 
At the end of a four-day jury trial, the lower court 
granted Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a directed verdict on the issue 
of negligence and denied Mr. LeBlanc's motion on the issue of 
proximate cause. (R. 669). The first issue of the instant 
appeal concerns the lower court's ruling denying Mr. LeBlanc's 
motion for a directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause. 
After deliberating for 1 hour and 10 minutes, the jury 
returned with a "no cause" verdict in Mr. Wilker's favor. See 
Exhibit "A." The second issue of the instant appeal concerns the 
sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury's verdict. 
Subsequently, Mr. LeBlanc moved the lower court for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial, which the lower court 
denied. See Exhibits "B" and "C." The third issue of the 
instant appeal concerns the lower court's order denying Mr. 
LeBlanc's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new 
trial. Mr. LeBlanc filed his Notice of Appeal on April 26, 1995. 
See Exhibit "D." 
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B. Statement of the Facts Related to the Issues Presented for 
Review. 
1. On or about October 6, 1992, Mr, LeBlanc, was in a rear-
end automobile collision with Mr. Wilker. (R. 95-95, 105-106). 
2. Mr. LeBlanc's automobile sustained approximately $6,000 
damage. (R. 98). 
3. Mr. LeBlanc was transported by ambulance to a local 
hospital's emergency room. (R. 99, 446). 
4. Mr. LeBlanc incurred expenses for his transport by 
ambulance. (R. Ill, 113). 
5. In the local hospital's emergency room, Mr. LeBlanc was 
examined by Dr. Amy Geruso. (R. 445-458). 
6. At the local hospital, x-rays, CT scans, and other 
diagnostic examination of Mr. LeBlanc were taken. (R. 445-450, 
454-456). 
7. Mr. LeBlanc incurred expenses for his x-rays and CT 
scans. (R. 112-113, 445-450, 454-456). 
8. At trial, medical expert witnesses testified that Mr. 
LeBlanc suffered whiplash from the automobile collision with Mr. 
Wilker. (R. 246-247, 450). 
9. At trial, medical expert witnesses testified that Mr. 
LeBlanc suffered psychological trauma and head injury from the 
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automobile collision with Mr. Wilker. (R. 177-179, 188-194, 260-
262, 384, 388, 397, 579-580, 639-640, 651). 
10. At trial, a medical expert witness testified that Mr. 
LeBlanc suffered back injuries from the automobile collision with 
Mr. Wilker. (R. 246-247). 
11. At trial, no medical expert witness testified to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that the foregoing 
injuries were not proximately caused by Mr. Wilker's automobile 
collision with Mr. LeBlanc. (R. 150-194, 238-296, 332-350, 370-
417, 443-458, 477-519, 568-587, 595-652). 
12. At trial, a medical expert witness testified that Mr. 
LeBlanc was "an extreme symptom magnifier." (R. 501). 
13. At trial, medical expert witnesses testified that Mr. 
LeBlanc was a malingerer. (R. 502, 586, 623-624, 645) . 
14. At trial, no medical expert witness testified to a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. LeBlanc did not 
receive any brain or head injury from the automobile collision 
with Mr. Wilker. (R. 150-194, 238-296, 332-350, 370-417, 443-458, 
477-519, 568-587, 595-652). 
15. At the close of Mr. Wilker's case, counsel for Mr. 
LeBlanc's moved for a directed verdict on the issues of 
negligence, proximate cause, cause in fact, and causation in 
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general. (R. 666-667). 
16. The trial court granted Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a 
directed verdict on the issue of negligence. (R. 669). 
17. The trial court denied Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a 
directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause. (R. 669). 
18. After deliberating for 1 hour and 10 minutes, the jury 
returned a "no cause" verdict. (R. 730), see Exhibit "A." 
19. On December 19, 1994, Mr. LeBlanc moved the trial court 
for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. See 
Exhibit "B." 
20. On April 3, 1995, the trial court denied Mr. LeBlanc's 
motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial. 
See Exhibit "C." 
21. On April 26, 1995, Mr. LeBlanc filed his Notice of 
Appeal. See Exhibit "D." 
VIII. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Because of the doctrine of avoidable consequences, no 
sufficient evidence exists to support the legal conclusions of 
the lower court that Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the 
proximate cause of any injuries sustained by Mr. LeBlanc in the 
automobile collision on or about October 6, 1992. Although Mr. 
Wilker presented sufficient evidence to raise a factual question 
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with regard to some of Mr. LeBlanc's claimed injuries, no factual 
question was raised with regard to other specific injuries 
claimed by Mr. LeBlanc. Therefore, this case should be reversed 
and remanded for further proceedings. 
IX. ARGUMENT 
I. THE DOCTRINE OF AVOIDABLE CONSEQUENCES PRECLUDES, AS A 
MATTER OF LAW, ANY FINDING THAT MR. WILKER' S NEGLIGENCE WAS 
NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY OF MR. LEBLANC7 S INJURIES. 
The overwhelming weight of evidence supports the 
propositions that Mr. LeBlanc: 1) needed an ambulance, 2) needed 
diagnostic examination, and 3) and did suffer neck, back, and 
closed head injuries proximately caused by the automobile 
collision with Mr. Wilker — which proved Mr. LeBlanc's case in 
chief, and which is summarized in section I.A. below. 
Essentially no evidence rebuts these propositions, but Mr. 
LeBlanc has marshaled that evidence in section II.A. below. 
A. The evidence marshaled in support of the lower court's 
rulings on Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a directed verdict on 
the issue of proximate cause and motion for a judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict and new trial is insufficient to 
support those rulings. 
A view of the evidence presented at trial in the light most 
favorable to the prevailing party cannot sustain a ruling that 
Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the proximate cause of any of Mr. 
8 
LeBlanc's injuries. In Utah, "[t]o successfully attack the 
verdict, an appellant must marshall all the evidence supporting 
the verdict and then demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to that verdict, the evidence is 
insufficient to support it." Cambelt Int'l Corp. v. Dalton, 745 
P.2d 1239, 1242 (Utah 1987) . All evidence which could arguably 
support the verdict is marshaled in section II.A., infra, pp. 21-
31. 
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the 
evidence marshaled in support of the jury's verdict may be 
sufficient to support a finding that Mr. Wilker's negligence was 
not the cause of some of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries. However, the 
testimony of Dr. Daniel Vine regarding diagnostic examinations 
and Mr. Wilker's witness, the emergency room physician Dr. Amy 
Geruso, precludes a ruling that, as a matter of law, Mr. Wilker's 
negligence was not the cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries. 
The relevant portions of Officer Todd Griffiths' testimony 
regarding the automobile collision scene follows. 
Officer Todd Griffiths 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 99. 
Q What did you do next — strike that. Did you see Mr. 
LeBlanc any further at the scene? 
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A No. Like I say, he was being attended to by medical 
personnel. I talked to him briefly at the scene and 
then I let them do their job in taking care of him. 
Q Did you have a chance to see what they did? 
A When I arrived I believe they had just taken him out of 
the vehicle on a stretcher, neck brace, back board, 
loading him into the ambulance. 
The relevant portions of Dr. Vine's testimony regarding the 
diagnostic examination of Mr. LeBlanc follows. 
Dr. Daniel Vine, Mr. LeBlanc's neurologist. 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 374-375, 417. 
Q Now, will you explain to us just generally your course 
of treatment of Fred LeBlanc, Doctor, if you would from 
this point forward? 
A Well, based on some of the work that had been done x-
ray-wise even before I saw Fred, I was concerned that 
there was a problem with his back. And his main 
complaints were involving his back and his neck, pain. 
So if there is a question of a disk problem, of a 
ruptured disk, it basically boils down to two ways to 
treat it, surgery or not surgery. So initially I 
wanted to ascertain whether or not surgery was going to 
be necessary. 
Q How do you make that ascertainment? 
A Well, for me I referred him to a surgeon because I 
wanted an expert opinion along those lines. . . . 
Redirect examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. 
Summerhays at R. 417. 
Q Were the medical expenses and bills that you charged to 
Mr. LeBlanc reasonable and necessary under the 
circumstances? 
A I thought so. 
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The relevant portions of Dr. Geruso's testimony regarding 
Mr. LeBlanc's post-collision ambulance ride and diagnostic 
examination follows. 
Dr. Amy Michelle Geruso, Mr. LeBlanc's emergency room physician. 
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 
446-450. 
Q What was your understanding as to why he was coming 
into the emergency room? 
A Well, he told me that he was stopped at a stop sign, 
was restrained in a seat belt and was rear-ended by 
another car. He was transported by the ambulance in a C 
collar and on a backboard. And that's when I saw him. 
Q Would you just in brief narrative fashion explain to 
the jury what examination you took him through and 
maybe help them understand why. 
A If the patient is complaining of neck pain, I need to 
check for tenderness on palpation to the muscles in the 
neck. And he did complain of some tenderness over his 
cervical spine. And he was still in the cervical 
collar at that time. So what we do is send them to the 
radiologist for x-rays without taking the collar off to 
make sure there is no unstable fractures or problems 
there. So he did go to radiology for cervical spine 
x-rays. The radiologist had a question about one of 
the bones, so he was sent directly to CT scan for 
limited views of the certain cervical bone that the 
radiologist had a question of, and that was cleared as 
no fractures, no pathology. And so they were able to 
remove the cervical collar in the radiology department 
and send him back to me for the remainder of the 
examine [sic]. 
So with the collar off he did have some tenderness 
of the muscles, the paracervical muscles next to the 
spine. He had full range of motion of his neck, so 
full flexion and forward and lateral flexion. You're 
also concerned about a good neurological examine [sic] 
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so you test for strength and sensation in the arms and 
reflexes, and those were all normal. 
Then further on the back examine [sic], just go 
along the spine, just checking for tenderness, go along 
the muscles next to the spine. And he did have some 
mild tenderness in his lower back. So even though he 
hadn't complained of lower back pain, he had a little 
bit of discomfort there in the muscles. 
Q What were your specific findings with regard to the 
neck? 
A That he had some tenderness over the paracervical 
muscles and also mild tenderness over the cervical 
spine, but that he did have full range of motion. 
Q What was your diagnosis after seeing Mr. LeBlanc and 
examining him? 
A My diagnosis was cervical neck strain, muscle strain 
and also lumbar muscle strain. 
Cross examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 455-456. 
Q Now, you felt his condition was serious enough to get 
an x-ray. Is that right? 
A Yes. 
Q What implications, if any, does that have? Is it 
routine for everybody that comes in to have them have 
an x-ray? 
A For motor vehicle accidents, any neck or back pain 
warrants a x-ray. 
Q So you did that out of abundance of caution. 
A He was complaining of neck pain. And we could not 
clear his cervical spine without x-rays. 
(R. 446-456). 
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Dr. Geruso's testimony is significant by establishing that 
Mr. LeBlanc experienced pain and injuries immediately after the 
automobile collision with Mr. Wilker. 
In Hansen v. Mountain Fuel Supply Co., the Supreme Court of 
Utah held that "the doctrine of ^avoidable consequences' mandates 
that the plaintiff submit to medically advisable treatment. 
Failure to do so may destroy the plaintiff's right to recover for 
a condition that he or she could have thereby avoided or 
alleviated". 858 P.2d 970, 976 (Utah 1993). Assuming arguendo 
that Mr. LeBlanc suffered no physical injuries from the rear-end 
automobile with Mr. Wilker, the undisputed testimony shows that 
it was prudent, reasonable and necessary to transport Mr. LeBlanc 
by ambulance to a local hospital for emergency room treatment—if 
only to find that Mr. LeBlanc was in perfect health. Dr. Vine 
also acted reasonably in ordering diagnostic examinations for Mr. 
LeBlanc. Such principles underlie Utah's medical monitoring case 
law. Id. 
However, the lower court erroneously ruled that Mr. Wilker's 
negligence was not a proximate cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's 
injuries, in view of the fact that Mr. Wilker failed to proffer 
any evidence which would have shown either that Mr. LeBlanc did 
not incur specific costs or that Mr. LeBlanc's treatments were 
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not reasonable and necessary. In Hansen, the Utah Supreme Court 
held that costs attributable to diagnostic examination are 
"consistent with the definition of ^injury' in the Restatement of 
Torts." Id. at 977 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 7). 
To illustrate this point, the Hansen court borrowed a 
hypothetical employed by the United States Court of Appeals for 
the District of Columbia. See Friends For All Children, Inc. v. 
Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984). 
In affirming a federal district court's order "that a 
reasonable need for medical examinations is compensable, even 
absent proof of other injury," the Friends court stated: 
To aid our analysis of whether tort law should 
encompass a cause of action for diagnostic examinations 
without proof of actual injury, it is useful to . . . 
hypothesize a simple, everyday accident involving two 
individuals, whom we shall identify as Smith and Jones: 
Jones is knocked down by a motorbike which Smith is 
riding through a red light. Jones lands on his head 
with some force. Understandably shaken, Jones enters a 
hospital where doctors recommend that he undergo a 
battery of tests to determine whether he has suffered 
any internal head injuries. The tests prove negative, 
but Jones sues Smith solely for what turns out to be 
the substantial cost of the diagnostic examinations. 
From our example, it is clear that even in the absence 
of physical injury Jones ought to be able to recover the 
cost for the various diagnostic examinations proximately 
caused by Smith's negligent action. A cause of action 
allowing recovery for the expense of diagnostic examinations 
recommended by competent physicians will, in theory, deter 
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misconduct whether it be negligent motorbike riding or 
negligent aircraft manufacture. The cause of action also 
accords with commonly shared intuitions of normative justice 
which underlie the common law of tort. The motorbike rider, 
through his negligence, caused the plaintiff, in the opinion 
of medical experts, to need specific medical services—a 
cost that is neither inconsequential nor of a kind the 
community generally accepts as part of the wear and tear of 
daily life. Under these principles of tort law, the 
motorbiker should pay. 
Friends, 746 F.2d at 825 (emphasis added). In the instant case, 
the testimony of both Dr. Geruso and Dr. Vine exemplify 
situations where the doctrine of avoidable consequences mandates 
that Mr. Wilker should pay for the costs Mr. LeBlanc incurred as 
a direct and proximate result of the automobile collision. 
Additional testimony from medical experts — which the jury 
had to disbelieve in order to reach its "no cause verdict" — 
supports the proposition that Mr. LeBlanc was injured and that 
such injuries were proximately caused by Mr. Wilker's negligence. 
Dr. Ralph Gant, Mr. LeBlanc's psychologist. 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 176-177. 
Q Based on your initial history and review of his 
condition, what were your initial working diagnoses? 
A For Mr. LeBlanc, my initial diagnosis was that of a 
post concussional syndrome, in other words, the 
aftermath of a concussion. In addition, Mr. LeBlanc 
presented with a significant amount of depression. 
Q After your 45 hours of review, what are your current 
diagnoses for Mr. LeBlanc? 
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A Well, the question is somewhat complex. Mr. LeBlanc 
has been retested, I understand, and I have copies of a 
report of a second follow-up testing with him. Mr. 
LeBlancfs condition appears quite deteriorated over 
time. He still presents with the signs of major 
depression. He still presents with the generalized 
anxiety disorder. But there is some signs of emerging 
panic that are quite severe as well. Mr. LeBlanc 
presents a significant number of panic attacks per 
week. 
Mr. LeBlanc also, if the more recent testing is in 
any way accurate, looks more like a dementia which is a 
more serious disorder, than a post concussional. It 
looks more like a dementia due to head trauma. This is 
a condition which is especially marked by losses of 
memory, general cognitive functioning, losses of 
concentration and tension. So this is more to the 
point of what we are seeing right now. 
Dr. Gant (cont.) 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 265-266. 
Q Now, Dr. Gant, there has been a lot of discussion here, 
and I suppose there will be a lot more, about the fact 
that Mr. LeBlanc is malingering or embellishing or 
lying or misrepresenting. In your opinion has he told 
you the truth, and is your opinion based upon valid 
medical evidence? 
A I believe that my opinions are based upon valid 
information, information that I have corroborated 
through interviews and testing and through my interview 
with Mr. LeBlanc!s wife. I don't have any evidence of 
malingering on the part of Mr. LeBlanc. I have had 
reports of his involvement with other psychologists in 
which information that he reported was not exactly 
correct. But I don't have that experience with Mr. 
LeBlanc. 
Q In your opinion did he tell you the truth? 
A In my opinion, my information is valid. 
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Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 272-
273, 274-275. 
Q These charts that I have gone through with you result 
in 19 different psychological symptoms that you have 
diagnosed. You are relating all of those to the car 
accident. Right? 
A I have no other evidence beyond that. 
Q Maybe you just lost me. 
Now this is all attributable to the one single 
episode that you have discussed, correct, the one 
single trauma? 
A That's the only trauma of which I am aware. 
Q Do you know if Mr. LeBlanc even struck his head on 
anything inside that car when the accident occurred? 
A The only evidence I have are the reports of a dentist 
who has indicated to me that teeth were fractured, that 
there has been an injury to the temperomandibular [sic] 
regions. 
Redirect examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. 
Summerhays at R. 292. 
Q Was that caused by the accident in your opinion, 
growing out of the dementia due to head trauma? 
A If indeed the dementia had occurred and there were no 
other episodes to explain it, I could find nothing else 
to attribute that to. 
Recross examination by Mr. Wilkerfs counsel Brett Pearce at R. 
296. 
Q Dr. Gant, are you saying that this accident may have 
affected Mr. LeBlanc's acts to be honest with 
healthcare providers? 
A I'm saying that Mr. LeBlanc's judgment is obviously 
impaired, his memory is impaired, his attention, 
17 
concentration are impaired. His ability to think 
logically, even to the point of understanding 
consequence is affected. I — and I don't know that 
Mr. LeBlanc remembers a good part of what he does say 
to people. 
In short, Dr. Gant testified that Mr. LeBlanc suffered from: 
1) psychological injury proximately caused by head trauma during 
the automobile collision with Mr. Wilker, and 2) emotional 
problems not caused by the automobile collision. The existence 
of the latter does not preclude the existence of the former. 
Dr. Richard Wright, Mr. LeBlanc's chiropractor. 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlancfs counsel J. Robert Latham at 
R. 240, 246, 247. 
Q And why was he a patient in your clinic? 
A He entered the clinic due to injuries sustained at the 
time of a motor vehicle accident. 
Q (By Mr. Latham) Dr. Wright, would you please give us 
your opinion as to whether Mr. LeBlancfs back injuries 
were caused by his accident? 
A I believe they were, yes. 
Q Doctor, do you feel that all the treatments that you 
rendered to Mr. LeBlanc were medically necessary? 
A I think so, yes. 
The essence of Dr. Wright's testimony is that Mr. LeBlanc's 
back injuries were caused by the automobile collision with Mr. 
Wilker. 
Dr. Daniel Vine, Mr. LeBlanc's neurologist. 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
18 
at R. 384. 
Can you say with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that it's your opinion that Fred LeBlanc 
suffered some type of some degree of brain injury 
resulting in the tinnitus, or anything else, the 
ringing in the ear, in this accident? 
I would have to say in my opinion — that was my 
impression, that was my opinion. I was using that as a 
working hypothesis, yes, even though it may be hard to 
prove with any other type of test. But that was my 
impression. 
Redirect examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. 
Summerhays at R. 417. 
Q Were the medical expenses and bills that you charged to 
Mr. LeBlanc reasonable and necessary under the 
circumstances? 
A I thought so. 
Dr. Vine affirmatively testified that Mr. LeBlanc suffered 
brain injury caused by the automobile collision with Mr. Wilker, 
and that the costs incurred by Mr. LeBlanc were reasonable and 
necessary. 
A new trial should be granted when the jury's verdict is 
"manifestly against the weight of the evidence." Goddard v. 
Hickman, 685 P.2d 530, 532 (Utah 1984). Under the doctrine of 
avoidable consequences, reasonable minds could not differ that 
Mr. Wilker's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of Mr. 
LeBlanc's post-collision ambulance ride, emergency room 




LeBlanc. Therefore, this Court should reverse the lower court's 
order denying: 1) Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a directed verdict on 
the issue of proximate cause, and 2) Mr. LeBlanc's motion for a 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict and new trial and remand 
this matter for further proceedings. 
II. EVIDENCE DISPUTING THE EXTENT OF MR. LEBLANC S INJURIES IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A LEGAL CONCLUSION THAT MR. WILKER'S 
NEGLIGENCE WAS NOT THE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF ANY OF MR. 
LEBLANC S INJURIES. 
"To successfully attack the verdict, an appellant must 
marshall all the evidence supporting the verdict and then 
demonstrate that, even viewing the evidence in the light most 
favorable to that verdict, the evidence is insufficient to 
support it." Cambelt, 745 P.2d at 1242. Mr. LeBlanc satisfies 
his duty to marshall the evidence in order to attack the jury's 
"no cause" verdict in the following section. 
A. The evidence marshaled in support of the jury's verdict is 
insufficient to support that verdict. 
The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support 
the jury's finding that Mr. Wilker's negligence was not the 
proximate cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries, thereby 
warranting a directed verdict on the issue of proximate cause, or 
a judgment notwithstanding the verdict and order for a new trial. 
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Even when read in a light most favorable to the jury's verdict, a 
meaningful review of the evidence which could arguably support 
the jury's verdict shows that the evidence merely fails to 
affirm, rather than raises a factual question of, evidence of Mr. 
LeBlanc's injuries. The relevant portions of that evidence which 
could arguably support the jury's verdict follows. 
Dr. Walter H. Reichert 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 165. 
Q Is this the kind of an injury that can typically be 
caused by a whiplash in a car accident? 
A It could be caused by a car accident, yes. 
Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 166, 
169. 
Q There is no way to be certain from your experience 
whether the automobile accident in this case caused 
that protrusion. Correct? 
A That is correct. 
Q There are lots of other possible causes to these types 
of conditions that show on films, aren't there? 
A There are. 
Q If I am understanding you correctly, you can't say with 
any reasonable degree of medical certainty that these 
conditions you have diagnosed and testified about were 
caused by the accident which is the subject of this 
lawsuit. Right? 
A Not solely on the basis of the imaging studies. 
Dr. Reichert's testimony is significant by suggesting that 
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Mr. LeBlanc's injury "could be caused by a car accident," but 
that such causation could not be established with a reasonable 
degree of medical certainty. Dr. Reichert's position, at worst, 
is neutral on the issue of proximate cause. 
Dr. L. Vaun Mikesell, Mr. LeBlanc's maxillofacial surgeon. 
Direct examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 338, 339. 
Q And specifically what did you see in the joint that you 
thought represented a damaged condition that was caused 
by the accident? 
A Again, based on the MRI, the results of the MRI 
indicated that there was a mild subluxation of the 
disk, which to me means that the disk is dislocated a 
little anterior, not as far as we sometimes see. And 
when he opened, he got onto the disk. And that I see 
often in trauma, auto accidents. 
Q Was the crepitus in your opinion caused by the 
accident? 
A It could have been caused by the accident. I don't 
know for sure. 
Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 345-
346 
Q My question to you, Doctor, is combining the two. If 
you have got the large restorations and combine 
long-term bruxing with that on those teeth, could that 
cause the teeth to fracture? 
A I suspect it could. 
Q This crepitus that we were talking about and it's 
relationship to arthritis, there is a fairly 
substantial percentage of our population that develops 
this condition naturally, isn't there? 
A Of bruxism? 
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Q No. Of crepitus. 
A Crepitus. I doi ift know 'what the population I have 
not seen statistics that would indicate to me the 
population percentage of people that would have this. 
The percentage of people that have TMJ disorder is 
around 33 percent. 
Re cr o s s ex am i i 1 a I: :i :: i :i 1: ;v 1 1 :i : W i ] k e i ' s c o un s e J B r e 11 P e a r c e a t P 
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Q Dr. Mikesell, you indicated earlier that the symptoms 
you found or the condition you diagnosed could have 
been related to the accident but you couldn't tell for 
sure? 
A I have to go by history • hey 
relate to the accident. 
Q' By his to: . i elate . - . can't: say for 
sure? 
A That's right. 
Q So you can't say with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that they were? 
^ ji m s o r r y / rephrase the question. 
Q So you can't say with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that they were? 
A I — I — my personal feeling, and I would say what I 
said earlier, based on his history I would feel that 
they were in part, if not mostly, associated with the 
accident. He does not give any prior history, and I 
have not seen anything to indicate that he had a prior 
history of TMJ disorder. 
The significance of Dr. Mikesell's testimony is that he is 
unable to say within a reasonable degree of medical certainty 
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that Mr. LeBlanc's TMJ and crepitus injuries were caused by the 
automobile collision with Mr. Wilker. Thus, such injuries are 
not a compensable item of recovery. 
Dr. Daniel Vine, Mr. LeBlanc's neurologist. 
Cross examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 399-
400. 
Q Beginning at line 17, my question is,, 
"Q Can you say with any degree of medical 
certainty that the sinus or decreased sensation 
that you found had anything to do causally with 
the car accident in which he was involved?" 
And your answer is, 
"A It would be hard for me to say with any 
degree of certainty." 
Do you see that? 
A I do. 
Q Does that refresh your recollection as of that day? 
A I believe that's what I believed at that time. 
Q The vision problem that Mr. LeBlanc reported to you 
wasn't accident-related, was it? 
A I don't know. Again, in this constellation of 
symptoms, this post concussive syndrome, there are a 
lot of things we can't explain physiologically. I 
believe — I don't know that. I don't know to be 
honest with you. I don't know if it was. 
In my exam, and I do an eye exam as part of my 
exam, everything seemed to be okay. But again, we 
didn't have a formal exam, so I don't know. 
Q So you can't say with any reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that the vision problem had anything to do 
with the accident? 
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A I think it would be hard for me to say as a 
nonophthalmologist? 
A The higher tension that was described to you, that's 
not accident-related, is it? 
A Again, that would be difficult, 1 think, to directly 
relate to the accident. Again, : would have to say 
that's a nonexpert opinion, sir, 
Q Just quickly turn to page 31 of your deposition. Down 
at the very bottom, my question to you is, 
"Q Does the hypertension in your opinion have 
anything to do with the accident?" 
And you say, 
"A Initially when he went to the ER, maybe if he 
was shaken up it could have been. But persistent? 
I don't think so. I would be hard pressed to 
relate that directly to the accident." 
A Correct. 
I T . linn testified IlirH lie Wets unable to attribute Mr, 
LeBlanc's sinus problem, decreased sensation, vision problem, or 
hypertension to the automobi 
Significantly, Dr. Vine does not undermine his opinion that Mr. 
LeBlanc has suffered a brain injury from the automobile 
collision. 
Dr. James Guinn, physician who performed an independent medical 
exam (IME) at the insistence of Mr. Wilker's insurance carrier. 
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 
500, 501. 
Q And as a clinician and looking at somebody like Mr. 
?;S 
LeBlanc, can you formulate an opinion as to how long 
the grinding has been going on? 
A It would have had to have been at least ten years. My 
frank opinion is that it would probably have been 20 
years, but at least 10 years. 
Q Doctor, what did all this lead you to conclude? 
A It led me to conclude that this individual was an 
extreme symptom magnifyer [sic]. That he was being 
dishonest with me, that every step of the way he was 
not being candid about what his problems really were. 
Cross examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 506, 507-508, 515. 
Q Is there anything other thing that could be causing 
that problem? 
A Yes. There is a whole host of things. 
Q What is the next most likely thing? 
A The next most likely thing would be some type of 
trauma. 
Q Like this accident? 
A That's a possibility. 
Q So, first it could be the grinding, second it could be 
the accident. And the third you say, 
". . It is my opinion that his most serious 
problems are related to his neck and back, not his 
jaw. Anyone with his neck and back problems would 
experience jaw pain and dysfunction." 
Now, that's a pretty bald, flat out statement that it 
is your main opinion that the neck [sic] and jaw 
problems are caused from the neck — that the jaw 
problem is caused by the neck pain, isn't it? 
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A It's my opinion that he doesn't have a jaw problem, 
It's my opinion that if he did have jaw pain, that the 
likely source of it would be problems in his neck and 
back, not organic pathology itself. 
Q Doctor, help me understand. In your opinion Mr. 
LeBlanc does not have a jaw problem. Yet you say in 
your letter, "Anyone --" and he is somebody -- "anyone 
with his neck and back problems would experience jaw 
pain and dysfunction." What does that mean if it 
doesn't mean that Mr. LeBlanc is suffering, 
experiencing jaw pain and dysfunction because he has 
those kinds of neck and back problems. Isn't that what 
that means? 
A Yes. 
Q Now, y ou also said in your letter, didn't you, the 
clicking in his jaw may have been caused by the injury 
in question? 
A Yes. 
Dr. Gu 11 n : * - <=•• \ i m o i i;y i s s i gni f i cant by s t at i ng h i s op ii ii oi 1 
that although Mr. LeBlanc is "an extreme symptom magnifier," Mr. 
LeBlanc nonetheless had symptoms of inji lry Dr Gi i :i i .1 1 
effectively rendered an opinion that Mr. LeBlanc's jaw pain and 
dysfunction resulted from bruxism, not the automobile collision 
Dr. Lester John Nielsen, Jr., Social Security psychologist. 
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 
586, 587. 
Q Okay. In what way are all of these things that you 
have just described significant from your perspective? 
A Well, it certainly leads me to believe, unless 
something really traumatic happened to him between the 
time Dr. Gummow saw him and the time I saw him, he has 
to be embellishing — what do you call it? — 
malingering or whatever we want to call it. 
He did the opposite with me as he did with Dr. 
Guinn. I had to pull everything out. Instead of 
answering that he had all these problems with me, I had 
to observe that here was somebody really not able to 
communicate. I acknowledged he must have been in pain. 
He had a problem with his jaw, although he didn't pace 
around when he was with me. And I noticed that with 
some things that — his demeanor in other situations 
seemed to change somewhat. 
I had no idea whether either he had been on — he 
did show me the medications he was taking, the capsules 
that day, the bottles. But he didn't seem to be able 
to tell me much about what they were for or how often 
he took them. 
Q What is your opinion at this time? 
A Well, I certainly think that there were marked 
discrepancys [sic] between the person's claimed stress 
or disability and the objective findings. I think II 
and III there kind of stand out for me. I am in a 
position with what I have done that I would need to — 
I don't know what the ultimate outcome is here, but I 
would have the [sic] send an addendum back to Social 
Security to fill them in on what's gone on. 
Dr. Nielson's testimony merely states an opinion that Mr. 
LeBlanc was malingering with respect to his psychological 
problems, thereby providing sufficient evidence to find that Mr. 
LeBlanc did not suffer psychological injury from the automobile 
collision with Mr. Wilker. 
Dr. Richard Schwartz, Mr. LeBlanc's neurosurgeon. 
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 
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616-617. 
Q Thank you. Now, what was your opinion on that day 
regarding whether Mr, LeBlanc needed surgery in his 
back or neck? 
A Well, I didnft think that he was a good surgical 
candidate. But we have already looked at that. And I 
did order an MRI of the lumbar spine that hadn't been 
done. And that's an expensive test. But he is six 
months out from injury so I thought we ought to look at 
that again. But I wasn't impressed clinically that I 
could really confirm from his examination anything that 
would fit with that L 4/5 disk bulge. And often after 
motor vehicle accidents, flexion/extension injuries, 
there is a constellation of signs — insomnia, 
nonorganic pain — that kind of gets caught up into the 
secondary gain and this legal system we are in. And 
it's hard to separate out, and we see that often. 
But I wasn' t convinced that he should have any 
surgical procedure. And basically the other physicians 
don!t have to make that decision. 
Di: Schi la r tz' s test j in :>i \] ; i s s:i gni f icant I i i 1:1 lat i I: c:i D = s i r : 1: 
conclude that Mr. LeBlanc was not injured in the automobile 
collision with Mr. Wilker, only that Mr. LeBlanc's back iiljury 
does not warrant surgery. 
Dr. Linda Gummow, Mr. LeBlanc's neuropsychologist. 
Direct examination by Mr. Wilker's counsel Brett Pearce at R. 
639-640, 645. 
Q With regard to your opinion at the time you created 
your report or generated your report, what was your 
conclusion with regard to Mr. LeBlancfs overall 
condition and the relationship of that condition the 
car accident and to the Agent Orange? 
A Well, I didn't feel at that time that you could 
attribute the magnitude of problems that I was seeing 
to the car accident. It was out of the range of the 
normal that you see. Car accidents with a brief loss 
of consciousness where someone comes back to 
consciousness at the scene is rarely associated with 
long-term disability, except in maybe to 7 to 10 
percent of the case there can be some long-term 
disability. 
So when you see someone who is functioning 
essentially in the range of someone who would be 
classified as mentally retarded you have to say, okay, 
how does this happen? It doesn't make sense. So 
that's why I was looking for some other physical 
explanation I thought that might explain why his 
performance was so poor. 
Q Doctor, since reviewing all of the information that you 
received from my office, has that impacted your 
opinions from a psychological standpoint regarding Mr. 
LeBlanc? 
A Yes. 
Q What is your opinion now regarding Mr. LeBlanc? 
A I believe that the evidence is quite convincing that 
Mr. LeBlanc has been malingering. 
Q Doctor, given all this, can you say with any degree of 
reasonable certainty that Mr. LeBlanc sustained any 
head injury in this accident? 
A No, I cannot. 
Cross examination by Mr. LeBlanc's counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
at R. 645. 
Q Can you say with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that he did not receive any brain injury in 
this accident? 
A No. 
Dr. Gummow's testimony is significant for her opinion that 
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Mr. LeBlanc is malingering with respect to his psychological 
injur ie,1- H< n » > *• i
 (l I MI I*;IIIIIIII<'W W-:K; unable I >. counter witli n 
reasonable degree of medical certainty the testimony of Dr. Vine 
that M r. LeBlanc suffered a brain injury from the automobile 
collision with Mi Wi Iker. 
In summary, the statement of the record in the light most 
f avorab 1 e to 1:1 i = j i :n r ] * • s verdic t is as f o 1J c ws . Dr . Reichert 
testified that although Mr. LeBlanc's injury "could be caused by 
a car accidp- - e was i n :i sa;y t:l lat * ' ieqr — 
medical certainty that Mr. LeBlanc's injury was caused by the 
rear-end automobile collision with Mr. Wilker. (R. ] 65- ] 69). 
Dr. Gant, a psychologist, testified that Mr LeBlanc's suffered 
psychological trauma both attributable to the rear-end automobile 
collision with T l,r . Wilker, and not attributable to the collision. 
(R. 265-296). Dr. Wright testified that he believed Mr. 
L e B 1 a i i c' s b a c k :i i i j u r i e s w e i: e c a i i s e d b y t h e r e a i - e i i d c o 11 i s i o n 
with Mr. Wilker, and that his treatment of Mr. LeBlanc was 
reasonable and necessary. (R. 24 0, 24 6, 2 4 7 ) . 
Dr. Mikesell testified that Mr. LeBlanc's disk injury "could 
have been caused by the accident. I don't know for sure." (R. 
2 : \ 7:i !::1 i: egai d 1: : I l:i LeBlanc' s injury, Dr . Mikesell 
testified that, although could not say for sure whether it was 
related to the rear-end collision with Mr. Wilker, when asked by 
Mr. Wilker's counsel "So you can't say with a reasonable degree 
of medical certainty that [Mr. LeBlanc's TMJ symptoms] were 
[related]?", Dr. Mikesell replied: "[B]ased on his history, I 
would feel that they were in part, if not mostly, associated with 
the accident. He does not give any prior history, and I have not 
seen anything to indicate that he had a prior history of TMJ 
disorder." (R. 349). 
Dr. Vine testified with a reasonable degree of medical 
certainty that Mr. LeBlanc suffered from "some type of some 
degree of brain injury" and that the medical expenses and bills 
he charged to Mr. LeBlanc were "reasonable and necessary under 
the circumstances." (R. 384, 417). Dr. Vine also testified that 
he was unable to state with any degree of medical certainty that 
Mr. LeBlanc's sinus, decreased sensation, vision problem, 
hypertension were related to the rear-end collision with Mr. 
Wilker. (R. 399-400). 
Dr. Geruso testified that although Mr. LeBlanc complained of 
some neck and back pain, diagnostic examinations revealed no 
fractures, full range of neck motion, "full flexion and forward 
and lateral flexion," and normal "strength and sensation in the 
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arms." (R. 447-448), Dr. Geruso's diagnosis after examining Mr. 
LeB1 anc :i i 1 11 Ie e m ergenc y r c :>in i a s "ce:i : \ i ca ] i ieck s11 ain, muscle 
strain and also lumbar muscle strain." (R. 4 5 0 ) . Dr. Geruso 
testified *•*..• . :i ' w a s s e r i o u s e n o n i j I: J l u MI,JII 
x-rays and a CT scan . 
Dr. Guinn testified that Mr. LeBlanc was an "extreme symptom 
magnifier. (I \ 50] ) According to Dr Guinn, Mr. LeBlanc's jaw 
problems could have stemmed from teeth grinding or bruxism, and 
pre"- existed Ui»- i^di-end <iiit.omubile collision with Mr. Wilker. 
(R. 449-503). Dr. Guinn also attributed Mr. LeBlanc's TMJ 
d i s o r d e r t : "" p i: o b J e m s j i i 1 :i :i s i I e c k a i i :i I: a c ] :  , i I • : 1: c i: g a i i i c p a t 1 I o I o g y 
itself." (R. 5 0 8 ) , ;. : , Nielsen, a psychologist, testified that 
Mr. LeBlanc "has to be embellishing," '"malingering or whatever 
you want to r-. Schwartz testified that he 
"didn't think t\>h~ IM^. LeBlanc] was a good surgical candidate" 
for . .ge. (K, It,) . Dr, Gummow, a 
neuropsychologist, testified that in her opinion "the evidence is 
q u i t e c o n v i n c i n g t h a t Mr lii-jRlann lias I ^ P H nia 1 I n g e r J fig , ,/ (*. 
6 4 5 ) . Dr. Gummow, although being unable to testify with a 
reasonable degree of medical certainty that Mr. LeBlanc I I not 
sustain any brain injury related to the rear-end collision with 
Mr. Wilker, was also unable to testify "with any degree of 
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reasonable certainty that Mr. LeBlanc sustained any head injury 
in [the rear-end collision]." (R. 645). 
As discussed in Point I, supra, no evidence exists 
supporting the jury's verdict that Mr. Wilker's negligence was 
not the proximate cause of any of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries. In 
Smith v. Vuicich, 699 P.2d 763 (Utah 1985), the Utah Supreme 
Court held that an appellate court "will not upset a jury verdict 
unless there is a showing that the evidence so clearly 
preponderates against the prevailing party that reasonable people 
would not differ on the outcome of the case." Smith, 699 P.2d at 
764. 
The evidence may be sufficient to invalidate some of Mr. 
LeBlanc's claimed injuries, but not all; especially not his 
expenses incurred from the post-collision ambulance transport, 
emergency room treatment, diagnostic examinations, and other 
injuries. When evidence is so lacking or so slight and 
unconvincing in favor of a jury verdict, it is proper for an 
appellate court to reverse a ruling that is plainly unreasonable 
and unjust. See, e.g., Marsh v. Irvine, 449 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah 
1969) ("[T]he jury should not be allowed such unbridled license 
as to base its verdict upon something which would be a physical 
impossibility."). Because a meaningful review of the evidence 
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which could arguably support the jury's verdict shows that the 
evidence merely fail • - -
question of, some of Mr. LeBlanc's injuries, this Court should 
reverse the jury's verdict and remand this case for further 
proceedings. 
X. CONCLUSION 
C o m , . ">e unable to do much to counter the influence of 
insurance industry propaganda upon lay jurors. Courts are, 
however, ot J i g> s- ::i t : :i i i t e r ? e.z le w 1 lei i tl le facts ai id tl le law warrant 
a directed verdict, or when lay jurors issue a verdict that is 
unsupportable and unjust a s ^ maf t e t n f l >^ 
Wherefore, premises considered, this Court should reverse 
the lower court's order denying Mr. LeBlanc's motion for ji ldgment 
no* -.••:* he verdict and new trial should be reversed and 
remanded this case for a new trial on all issues or other 
proceeding In I hi:.1 n ] LtuLiid I \\/v, Llu.s I U U I I should remand the 
lower court's denial of Mr. LeBlanc's directed verdict on the 
issue of proximate cause and remar • - . 1 
all issues or other proceedings. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 29th day of March 1996. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
X 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
BRETT G. PEARCE [522 0] 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney for Defendant 
4021 South 700 East, #420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-7007 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
..ooOoo.. 
FRED LEBLANC, : 
JUDGMENT 
Plaintiff, : ol^b^SO 
CIVIL NO. 930904424PI 
JAMES WILKER, : 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Defendant. : 
The above-entitled action came on regularly for trial in the 
above-captioned Court before the Honorable Anne M. Stirba on November 
29, 1994. The plaintiff appeared through counsel Lowell V. Summerhays 
and Robert Latham, defendant appeared through counsel Brett G. Pearce. 
A jury was empaneled. Evidence was introduced, the jury instructed 
and the matter being fully argued the case was submitted to the jury 
which upon due deliberation, returned and made the following: 
SPECIAL VERDICT 
We, the jury in the above-entitled action find from a 
preponderance of the evidence the answers to the interrogatories or 
questions propounded to us as follows: 
1. Was defendant's negligence a proximate cause of the injuries 
sustained by the plaintiff? 
&HSHEE: Yes No X 
2. If you have answered Question 1 "yes" , s t a t e the amount 
FILED IN CLARK'S 6mQ£ 
Salt LaKc County Utah 
By. 
Dec i wwn 
Deputy Clerl 
of special and general damages, if any, sustained by the plaintiff 
as a proximate result of the injuries 
question was not answered "yes", do not answer this question. 
ANSWER: 
Special Damages: ;•_ _________ 
General Damages: $ 
TOTAL . 
WHEREFOR E i x >< :)i 1 Mc: t i • :x „ • : f ief€ dant, and :::. ;:ai lse a p p e a r i n g , i t 
i s hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED, that judgment ^ herebv entered in 
favor c f d^fpMiihiii
 fnij a^jdiiiot plaint; ill ^ . _r no cause 
c:. action and defendant is awarded his costs of court * he sum of 
FIVE THOUSAND, EIGHT HUNDRED SEVENTY TWO DOLLARS AND SIX CENTS 
i i is reelected by the Memorandum o: Costs. 
I do hereby certify that on this ^ ^ day of December, 1993, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing 'udgment to Lowell V. 
Summer-hays, E; Er 3 , 1 DAMSON & SI JM1 1ERHAYS, ^ - r.a-- • • . iuite 
314 r Murray, Utah 8410. 
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EXHIBIT "B" 
Lowell V. Summerhays (3154) 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
6400 Commerce Plaza 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-4495 
FILED 
^ n ' C n Fn3:25 
- «- - N I I 
L 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 







MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND 
NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 930904424PI 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Fred LeBlanc, by and through Lowell 
V. Summerhays of the firm Adamson & Summerhays and moves the 
above-entitled court for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict 
and a new trial, pursuant to Rules 50(b) and 59(a) of the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure, and submits a Memorandum in Support 
thereof concurrently with this motion. 
DATED this J / day of December, 1994. 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
MAITJNG CERTIFT CAT K 
I hei-Hry' certify that I mailed a true and correct copy c:r the 
foregoing Memorandum In Support of Plaintiff's Motion For Judgment 
Notwithstanding the verdict, first class mail, postage pre-paid to 
ill I  11 1 1 1 I  1 1 1 1 1 in i 11 i i ; 
Brett Pearce, Esq, 
Richard K. Spratley & Associates 
4021 South 700 East, #420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
ADAMSON fie SUMMERHAYS 
6400 Commerce Plaza 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 262-4495 
FILED 
c* , .— . — , 1 ^ - . #-wNf'rv f <% 
D 
A.JY 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 






MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT 
NOTWITHSTANDING THE VERDICT AND 
NEW TRIAL 
Civil No. 930904424PI 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
COMES NOW the plaintiff, Fred LeBlanc, by and through Lowell 
V. Summerhays of the firm Adamson & Summerhays herewith submits 
the following Memorandum In Support of Plaintifffs Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and New Trial, pursuant to 
Rules 50(b) and 59(a) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
1. On November 29, 1994, the above-entitled case came in 
the Third District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah before Judge Anne M. Stirba and a jury for four days. 
2. Both parties presented evidence, had expert witnesses 
and lay witnesses testify, and argued their cases. 
3. During the trial, counsel for the plaintiff made a 
motion for directed verdict on the grounds that the defendant was 
negligent in the operation of his automobile, that the 
defendant's negligence resulted in a rear-end collision with the 
plaintiff's automobile, that the plaintiff sustained injuries 
from the collision resulting in damages to the plaintiff, and 
that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries resulting in damages to the plaintiff. 
4. The court granted the plaintiff's motion on the issue of 
negligence and denied the plaintiff's motion on the issue of 
damages and proximate cause, which went to the jury. 
5. Upon due deliberation, the jury returned a verdict that 
the defendant's negligence was not the proximate cause of the 
plaintiff's injuries resulting in damages to the plaintiff, and 
therefore, did not reach the issue of damages. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THIS COURT SHOULD ENTER A JUDGMENT NOTWITHSTANDING THE 
VERDICT THAT THE DAMAGES THE PLAINTIFF SUSTAINED IN A REAR-
END AUTOMOBILE COLLISION WERE DIRECTLY AND PROXIMATELY 
CAUSED BY THE DEFENDANT'S NEGLIGENCE. 
The evidence presented by doctors testifying at trial was 
that the plaintiff was injured as the result of a rear-end 
automobile collision with the defendant on October 6, 1992. The 
jury, however, rendered a verdict that the collision was not a 
proximate cause of any of the plaintiff's injuries. In Koer v. 
Mavfair Mkts., 19 Utah 2d 339, 431 P.2d 566 (1967), the court 
granted a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because 
of the absence of any substantial evidence to support the 
verdict. In the instant case, the defendant failed to submit 
substantial evidence at trial proving that the defendant's 
negligence did not directly and proximately cause injuries to the 
plaintiff resulting in damage to the plaintiff. 
2 
For example, at trial the plaintiff submitted into evidence 
medical bills for transportation of the plaintiff to the 
emergency room of Holy Cross Hospital via Gold Cross Ambulance 
shortly after the rear-end automobile collision. However, 
despite the defendant's failure to proffer any evidence to prove 
that these costs were neither incurred by the plaintiff nor 
reasonable and necessary, the jury returned with a verdict 
stating that the defendant's negligence was not a proximate cause 
of any of the plaintiff's injuries resulting in damage to the 
plaintiff. 
Because reasonable minds could not differ that the 
defendant's negligence was a direct and proximate cause of the 
post-collision ambulance ride, emergency room treatment, and 
other injuries to the plaintiff resulting in damages to the 
plaintiff, this court should enter a judgment notwithstanding the 
verdict finding that the defendant's negligence directly and 
proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff resulting in damages 
to the plaintiff. 
II. ALTERNATIVELY, THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL BECAUSE THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
Should this court deny plaintiff's motion for judgment 
notwithstanding the verdict, this court should grant plaintiff's 
motion for a new trial. Pursuant to the testimony of Dr. Walter 
Reichert, Dr. Richard Wright and Dr. Daniel Vine, the plaintiff 
did sustain injuries as the result of the rear-end automobile 
3 
collision on October 6, 1992. In addition, at the scene of the 
rear-end automobile collision, the plaintiff was transported by 
ambulance to Holy Cross Hospital and treated by an emergency room 
physician, Dr. Amy Geruso, who was called by the defendant and 
testified that the plaintiff was indeed injured and that the 
plaintiff had been subjected to x-rays and other diagnostic tests 
to ascertain the extent of his injuries. Furthermore, other 
doctors called by the defendant at trial testified that the 
plaintiff had been injured in the rear-end automobile collision 
at issue. 
By determining that the defendant's negligence was not the 
proximate cause of the plaintiff's injuries causing damage to the 
plaintiff, the jury did not reach the issue of damages. 
Therefore, because insufficient evidence exists to support the 
jury's verdict, this court should grant the plaintiff's motion 
for a new trial. 
DATED this of December, 1994. 
Respectfully submitted, 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
Lowell V. Summerhays 
4 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing Memorandum in Support of Plaintiff's Motion For 
Judgment Notwithstanding the verdict, first class mail, postage 
pre-paid to the following: 
Brett Pearce, Esq. 
Richard K. Spratley & Associates 
4021 South 700 East, #420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
& 




CIVIL NO. 930904424PI 
Judge Anne M. Stirba 
BRETT G. PEARCE [5220] ^~V'%*~'-^ "--"•" 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES Tmr-JUG'C.^ —0...-1 
Attorney for Defendant 
4021 South 700 E a s t , #420 APR 3/1$ii5 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 266-7007 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 







CAME ON for hearing, plaintiffs Motion for Judgment 
Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New Trial, on 
March 13, 1995 at 1:30 p.m. Plaintiff was represented by his 
attorneys of record, Lowell V. Summerhays and Robert Latham. 
Defendant was represented by his counsel of record, Brett G. Pearce. 
Both parties had previously submitted written memoranda to the 
Court arguing their respective positions pertaining to the above-
described Motion. At the hearing, both parties presented oral 
argument to the Court. 
After reviewing the written memoranda and considering oral 
argument, the Court was of the opinion that ample evidence existed 
which supported the jury verdict and that plaintiff had failed to 
carry his burden pertaining to the instant Motion, to gather all of 
the evidence in support of the verdict and show that it was in some 
way insufficient to support the verdict. 
Therefore, after fully considering plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New 
Trial, and being fully advised, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that plaintiff's Motion for 
Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict or in the Alternative for a New 
Trial is denied. r-A 
DATED this ^ day of 1995 
^ P X ; ^ T , T H | S ' S A T R U E C O P Y 
v -Vc-u£'N£LD°CUMENTONFILE 
• ^  COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH. 




0£Pi/TY COURT C U
^ CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I do hereby certify that on this ^2Q_/day of March 1995, I 
mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Order to Lowell V. 
Summerhays, Esq., ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS, 448 East 6400 South, Suite 




Lowell V. Summerhays - 3154 
J. Robert Latham - 6915 
ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS 
448 East 6400 South, Suite 135 
Murray, Utah 84107 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 








) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
i Civil No. 930904424PI 
1 Judge Anne M. Stirba 
Notice is hereby given that Plaintiff and Appellant, Fred 
LeBlanc, by and through counsel, Lowell V. Summerhays, of the firm 
of ADAMSON & SUMMERHAYS, appeals to the Utah Supreme Court the 
final order of the Honorable Anne M. Stirba entered in this matter 
on April 3, 1995. The appeal is taken from the entire judgment. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
NOTICE OF APPEAL was mailed to the following, postage paid, on the 
J?£**aay of April, 1995. 
Brett G. Pearce 
RICHARD K. SPRATLEY & ASSOCIATES 
4021 South 700 East, #420 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
is' /'t.ajVs?x, 
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